Beliefs exhibit epistemic irrationality to the extent that they are badly supported by the evidence available to the agent, or are maintained despite counter-evidence which is available to the agent. There is an ongoing debate in philosophy and psychology as to whether false beliefs are epistemically irrational and whether they can have pragmatic benefits, even if they are epistemically irrational (Bortolotti & Sullivan-Bissett, 2015 Craigie & Bortolotti, 2014 Haselton & Nettle, 2006). In this paper we are interested in the nature of unrealistic optimism and other positive illusions as discussed in the psychological literature. Based on the classic and recent empirical literature on unrealistic optimism, we offer some preliminary answers to these questions, thereby laying the foundations for answering further questions about unrealistic optimism, such as whether it has biological, psychological, or epistemic benefits. We also ask to what extent unrealistically optimistic cognitive states are fixed. We are interested in whether cognitive states that are unrealistically optimistic are belief states, whether they are false, and whether they are epistemically irrational. Here we consider the nature of unrealistic optimism and other related positive illusions.
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